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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
For all inclusive list of the controlling case law, please see the section on 
the issues presented for review below. 
JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Section 
78-2a-3(2)(h) Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), is controlling, or the 
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement Support Act (URESA) is controlling, as the action 
was commenced pursuant to URESA? Whether, as URESA was repealed effective 
July 1, 1997, the proceedings shall be conformed to UIFSA as far as consistent with 
the vested, unalterable substantive rights of the parties? Whether, from July 1, 1997, 
forward, UIFSA is controlling, if and only if, application of UIFSA will affect only 
procedural and not vested, unalterable substantive rights of the parties? U.C.A. § 68-
2-6, U.C.A. § 68-2-7, U.C.A. § 68-2-9, U.C.A. § 68-3-5, U.C.A. § 68-3-3, Roark v. 
Crabtree, 893 P.2d 1058 (Utah 1995), Pilcher v. State, 663 P.2d 450 (Utah 1983). 
The applicable standard of appellate review is standard applicable to the matters of 
law, i.e. of correctness/correction of error. Kasper v. Nordfelt 165 Utah Adv. 
Rep.42, 43 (Utah App.1991), Garyson Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 
467, 470 (Utah 1989), Utah Sign, Inc. v. Utah Dep't of Transp.,896 P.2d 632, 633 
(Utah 1995), Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah App.1990). 
2. Whether for the proceedings, pursuant to UIFSA, the Trial Court, had acquired 
prerequisite personal and subject matter jurisdictions necessary for a valid Court 
Order or Judgment? Whether, subject matter jurisdiction was conferred on the Trial 
Court, as the petition for commencement of the action pursuant to UIFSA, is fatally 
defective? Whether, the Trial Court did have personal jurisdiction over the 
Defendant, due to fatally defective service of process? Whether the Defendant's 
Motion for Relief from Order and Dismissal of Action Pursuant to UIFSA, should 
have been ruled on by the Trial Court? U.R.C.P., Rule 3, Rule 4, Rule 12, Rule 
60(b)(4). Martin v. Nelson. 533 P.2d 897 (Utah 1975), Dennett v. Powers. 536 P.2d 
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135 (Utah 1975), Strand v. Associated Students. 561 P.2d 191 (Utah 1977), Watkiss 
& Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991), Barnard v. Wasserman. 855 
P.2d 243 (Utah 1993), Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor. 546 P.2d 888 
(Utah 1976), Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons. 817 P.2d 382 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). The applicable standard of appellate review is standard applicable to mixed 
matters of fact and law, i.e. of abuse of discretion and correctness/correction of 
error. Kasper v. Nordfelt.165 Utah Adv. Rep.42, 43 (Utah App. 1991), Garvson 
Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson. 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989), Utah Sign. Inc. 
v. Utah Dep't of Transp.,896 P.2d 632, 633 (Utah 1995), Smith v. Smith. 793 P.2d 
407, 409 (Utah App.1990),. Hansen v. Hansen.736 P.2d 1055, 1056 (Utah 
App. 1987), Crockett v. Crockett. 836 P.2d 818, 820 (Utah App. 1992), Davis v. 
Davis. 749 P.2d 647, 648 (Utah 1988), Dunn v. Dunn. 802 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Utah 
App.1990). 
3. Whether the governing law is that of the State where the obligor was present during 
the period for which support is sought? In the case herein, since the Defendant has 
been domiciled and residing in the State of Utah during the periods of controversy, 
whether the laws of the State of Utah govern, either under URESA or UIFSA? 
U.C.A.§ 77-31-7, U.C.A. § 78-45f-604, Lamberth v. Lamberth. 550 P.2d 200 (Utah 
1976). The applicable standard of appellate review is standard applicable to the 
matters of law, i.e. of correctness/correction of error. Kasper v. Nordfelt.165 Utah 
Adv. Rep.42, 43 (Utah App. 1991), Garvson Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson. 782 
P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989), Utah Sign. Inc. v. Utah Dep't of Transp.,896 P.2d 632, 
633 (Utah 1995), Smith v. Smith. 793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah App.1990). 
4. Whether the State of Pennsylvania has no statute of limitations applicable to support 
arreareages, or whether the State of Pennsylvania has a six year Statue of 
Limitations for collection of arreareages, codified in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5527 and 
interpreted in Cohen v. Cohen. 508 A.2d 561 (Pa.Super. 1986), Bullock v. Bullock 
639 A.2d 826 (Pa.Super. 1994), Miller v. Bistranskv. 679 A.2d 1300 (Pa.Super. 
1996), Miller v. Jollev. 500 A.2d 485 (Pa.Super. 1985), Horowitz v. Horowitz. 600 
A.2d 982 (Pa.Super. 1991). The applicable standard of appellate review is standard 
applicable to the matters of law, i.e. of correctness/correction of error. Kasper v. 
Nordfelt.165 Utah Adv. Rep.42, 43 (Utah App.1991), Garvson Roper Ltd. 
Partnership v. Finlinson. 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989), Utah Sign. Inc. v. Utah 
Dep't of Transp.,896 P.2d 632, 633 (Utah 1995), Smith v. Smith. 793 P.2d 407, 409 
(Utah App.1990). Whether the Utah eight year Statue of Limitations to collecting 
arreareages applies, either under URESA or UIFSA, as it is the longer of the two and 
the effect of the judgments obtained under either of the proceedings is identical. 
U.C.A.§ 77-31-7, U.C.A. § 78-12-22, U.C.A. § 78-45f-604, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5527, 
Seelev v. Park. 532 P.2d 684 (Utah 1975), Cohen v. Cohen. 508 A.2d 561 (Pa.Super. 
1986), Bullock v. Bullock 639 A.2d 826 (Pa.Super. 1994), Miller v. Bistranskv. 679 
A.2d 1300 (Pa.Super. 1996), Miller v. Jollev. 500 A.2d 485 (Pa.Super. 1985), 
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Horowitz v. Horowitz, 600 A.2d 982 (Pa.Super. 1991). Accordingly, whether only 
the arreareages for eight years prior to May 12, 1997, the date of commencement of 
this action remain, the rest are time barred, i.e. arrears accrued from the date of 
separation, September 11, 1985, through May 12, 1989, are time barred and only 
arrears from May 20,1989, the periodic installment due date, forward remain The 
applicable standard of appellate review is standard applicable to the matters of law, 
i.e. of correctness/correction of error. Kasper v. Nordfelt 165 Utah Adv. Rep.42, 43 
(Utah App.1991), Garvson Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 
(Utah 1989), Utah Sign, Inc. v. Utah Dep't of Transp.,896 P.2d 632, 633 (Utah 
1995), Smith v. Smith. 793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah App.1990). 
5. Whether the Plaintiff, is entitled to collect alimony or spousal support for the period 
the Plaintiff cohabited with a person of the opposite sex? Whether Order of The 
Court, that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon establishment by 
the party paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabiting with another person. 
U.C.A.§ 30-3-5(9) and Haddow v. Haddow. 707 P.2d 669, (Utah 1985). Whether, as 
the substantive rights of the parties accrued prior to enactment of UIFSA, URESA is 
controlling? U.C.A.§ 77-31-7, Lamberth v. Lamberth. 550 P.2d 200 (Utah 1976). 
Whether, as the arreareages for a period from May 1986 through March 1987 were 
reduced to judgment by Virginia Court, the Plaintiff is entitled to alimony or spousal 
support from April 1987, forward? The applicable standard of appellate review is 
standard applicable to mixed matters of fact and law, i.e. of abuse of discretion 
and correctness/correction of error. Kasper v. Nordfelt 165 Utah Adv. Rep.42, 43 
(Utah App.1991), Garvson Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 
(Utah 1989), Utah Sign, Inc. v. Utah Dep't of Transp.,896 P.2d 632, 633 (Utah 
1995), Smith v. Smith. 793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah App.1990), . Hansen v. Hansen,736 
P.2d 1055, 1056 (Utah App.1987), Crockett v. Crockett 836 P.2d 818, 820 (Utah 
App.1992), Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 648 (Utah 1988), Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 
1314, 1317 (Utah App.1990). 
6. Whether the Defendant, is entitled to 50% reduction in base child support obligation, 
for each child, for time periods during which the children were with the noncustodial 
parent by order of the court or by written agreement of the parties for at least 25 of 
any 30 consecutive days? Whether, child support obligation should be adjusted 
accordingly? U.C.A.§ 78-45-7.11(1). The applicable standard of appellate review is 
standard applicable to the matters of law, i.e. of correctness/correction of error. 
Kasper v. Nordfelt 165 Utah Adv. Rep.42, 43 (Utah App.1991), Garvson Roper Ltd. 
Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989), Utah Sign. Inc. v. Utah 
Dep'tofTransp.,896 P.2d 632, 633 (Utah 1995), Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407, 409 
(Utah App.1990). 
7. Whether the amount of arrears reduced to sum certain by the Judgment and Order of 
February 4, 1998, without a prerequisite hearing, upon which execution against the 
defendant may be issued is the correct amount? The applicable standard of appellate 
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review is standard applicable to mixed matters of fact and law, i.e. of abuse of 
discretion and correctness/correction of error. Kasper v. Nordfelt 165 Utah Adv. 
Rep.42, 43 (Utah App.1991), Garyson Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 
467, 470 (Utah 1989), Utah Sign. Inc. v. Utah Dep't of Transp.,896 P.2d 6325 633 
(Utah 1995), Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah App.1990),. Hansen v. 
Hansen.736 P.2d 1055, 1056 (Utah App.1987), Crockett v. Crockett. 836 P.2d 818, 
820 (Utah App.1992), Davis v. Davis. 749 P.2d 647, 648 (Utah 1988), Dunn v. 
Dunn. 802 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Utah App.1990). 
8. Whether the parties are entitled to present evidence to resolve the contested amounts 
of payments made by the Defendant before the Trial Court? Whether it was clearly 
erroneous for the defendant not to have his day in court? The applicable standard of 
appellate review is standard applicable to mixed matters of fact and law, i.e. of 
abuse of discretion and correctness/correction of error. Kasper v. Nordfelt 165 Utah 
Adv. Rep.42, 43 (Utah App.1991), Garyson Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson. 782 
P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989), Utah Sign. Inc. v. Utah Dep't of Transp.,896 P.2d 632, 
633 (Utah 1995), Smith v. Smith. 793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah App.1990), . Hansen v. 
Hansen.736 P.2d 1055, 1056 (Utah App.1987), Crockett v. Crockett. 836 P.2d 818, 
820 (Utah App.1992), Davis v. Davis. 749 P.2d 647, 648 (Utah 1988), Dunn v. 
Dunn. 802 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Utah App.1990). 
STATUTES DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL 
§ 68-2-6. Accrued rights not affected by repeal. 
This repeal of existing statues shall not affect any act done, any right accruing or 
which has accrued or has been established, or any suit or proceeding had or 
commenced in any civil cause before the time when such repeal takes effect; but 
the proceedings in such cases shall be conformed to the provisions of these 
revised statues as far as consistent. 
§ 68-2-7. Effect on limitation of actions. 
When a limitation or period of time prescribed in any existing statute for 
acquiring a right or barring a remedy, or for any other purpose, has begun to run 
before these revised statutes go into effect, and the same or any other limitation 
is prescribed in these revised statutes, the time which has already run shall be 
deemed a part of the time prescribed as such limitation by these revised statutes. 
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§ 68-2-9. Effect on suits and prosecutions pending. 
No suit or prosecution, pending when this repeal takes effect, for an offense 
committed, or for the recovery of a penalty or forfeiture incurred, shall be 
affected by the repeal, but the proceedings may be conformed to the provisions 
of these revised statutes as far as consistent. 
§ 68-3-5. Effect of repeal. 
The repeal of a statute does not revive a statute previously repealed, or affect any 
right which has accrued, any duty imposed, any penalty incurred, or any action 
or proceeding commenced under or by virtue of the statute repealed. 
§ 68-3-3. Retroactive effect. 
No part of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so declared. 
U.C.A. § 78-45f-311: OJIFSA) 
The petition must specify the relief sought. The petition and the accompanying 
documents must conform substantially with the requirements imposed by the 
forms mandated by federal law for use in cases filed by a support enforcement 
agency. 
U.C.A. § 78-45f-604. Choice of Law (TJIFSA) 
(1) The law of the issuing state governs the nature, extent, amount, and duration 
of current payments and other obligations of support and the payment of 
arrearages under the order. 
(2) In a proceeding for arrearages, the statute of limitations under the laws of this 
state or of the issuing state, whichever is longer, applies. 
U.C.A. § 77-31-7: Choice of Law OJRESA) 
''Duties of support applicable under this act are those imposed or imposable 
under the laws of any state where the obligor was present during the period for which 
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support is sought. The obligor is presumed to have been present in the responding state 
during the period for which support is sought until otherwise shown". .1 
U.C.A. § 78-12-1: Limitations of Actions 
"civil actions may be commenced only within the periods prescribed in this 
chapter, after the cause of action has accrued, except in specific cases where a 
different limitation is prescribed by statute". 
U.C.A. § 78-12-22: Limitations of Actions for Duties of Support 
action may be brought within eight years: 
upon a judgment or decree of any court of the United States, or of any state 
or territory within the United States; 
to enforce any liability due or to become due, for failure to provide support 
or maintenance for dependent children. 
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5527: Limitations of Actions for Duties of Support 
"Any civil action or proceeding which is neither subject to another limitation 
specified in this subchapter nor excluded from the application of a period of 
1 Pennsylvania has similar provision in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4507 for the Choice of Law: 
"Duties of support applicable under this chapter are those imposed under the laws of 
any state where the obligor was present for the period during which support is sought. 
The obligor is presumed to have been present in the responding state during the period 
for which support is sought until otherwise shown". 
8 
limitation by section 5531^ (relating to no limitation) must be commenced within 
six years".3 
U.C.A. § 30-3-5(9): Bar to Alimony 
(9) "Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former 
spouse is cohabiting with another person".4 
Compiler's Notes to U.C.A. § 30-3-5(9): 
"Laws 1995, ch. 330, which amended this section, provides in § 2 that the 
Legislature does not intend that termination of alimony based on cohabitation, in 
accordance with Subsection (9), "be interpreted in any way to condone such a 
relationship for any purpose." 
U.C.A. § 78-45-7.11: Extended Visitation 
1) the child support order shall provide that the base child support award be 
reduced by 50% for each child for time periods during which the child is with 
the noncustodial parent by order of the court or by written agreement of the 
242Pa.C.S.A. §5531, reads: 
"The following actions and proceedings may be commenced at any time 
notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter except section 5521 (relating to 
limitations on foreign claims): 
(3) An action by the commonwealth, a county or an institution district against the real 
or personal property of persons who were legally liable to pay for the maintenance and 
support of persons who were public charges, including mental patients, to recover the 
cost of their maintenance and support." 
Enacted July 9, 1976, P.L. 586, No. 142, § 2, effective June 27, 1978. 
3
 In 1982, Dec. 20, P.L. 1409, no. 326, art. II, § 201, effective in 60 days. It amended 
former statutory provision, which was enacted July 9, 1976, P.L. 586, no. 142 § 2, 
effective June 27, 1978. 
4 As amended, effective May 1, 1995. The prior statutory provision (former subsection 
(6)), provided that: 
(6) "Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former 
spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if it is further 
established by the person receiving alimony that that relationship or 
association is without any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume". 
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parties for at least 25 of any 30 consecutive days. If the dependent child is a 
recipient of Aid to Families with Dependent Children, any agreement by the 
parties for reduction of child support during extended visitation shall be 
approved by the administrative agency. However, normal visitation and 
holiday visits to the custodial parent shall not be considered an interruption of 
the consecutive day requirement. 
2) For purposes of this section the per child amount to which the abatement 
applies shall be calculated by dividing the base child support award by the 
number of children included in the award. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a final Judgment and Order of February 4, 1998, 
entered by Honorable William H. Bohling, in the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in an enforcement proceedings for duties of support for 
dependent children upon a Virginia Divorce Decree. The proceedings were commenced 
pursuant to Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act ("URESA") On May 
12,1997. 
The sole issue before this Honorable Court is: 
WHAT IS THE AMOUNT OF ARREARS. UPON WHICH EXECUTION AGAINST 
THE DEFENDANT MAY BE ISSUED? 
At the heart of the dispute is the fact that the amount of arrears from April 
1987, forward, has not been determined or reduced to judgment by the initiating 
tribunal, passing and entrusting that duty to the Trial Court. 
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Course of the Proceedings 
The proceedings in the case herein were commenced pursuant to URESA. 
On March 20, 1997, the State of Pennsylvania, through Montgomery 
County Domestic Relations Section (DRS), transmitted to the State of Utah, through the 
Office of Recovery Services (ORS) of the Department of Human Services, a URESA 
petition, on a federally designated interstate form. 
On Child Support Enforcement Transmittal, the Plaintiffs indicated by 
checking a pre-printed box that the requested action was: Income Withholding, 
Collection of Arrears (URESA or UEFJA), Enforcement of Existing Order (URESA), 
Other: Reopen.5 
On Child Support Enforcement Acknowledgment, the Plaintiffs indicated 
by checking a pre-printed box that the requested action was: Income Withholding, 
Collection of Arrears (URESA or UEFJA), Enforcement of Existing Order (URESA), 
Other: Reopen.6 
Child Support Enforcement Transmittal, Child Support Enforcement 
Acknowledgment and Local Data Sheet were all signed on March 20, 1997, by Janice 
A. Wilson/URESA.7 
5 See Chronological Index of the Record (CIR), State of Utah's Legal Brief of 12/1/97, 
Exhibit M. Reporter's Transcripts (R.T.) of 12/8/97 at pg. 33. 
6 CIR and State of Utah's Legal Brief of 12/1/97, Exhibit M & R.T. of 12/8/97 at pg. 
33. 
7 CIR and State of Utah's Legal Brief of 12/1/97, Exhibit M & R.T. of 12/8/97 at pg. 
33. 
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On May 12,1997, the State of Utah, pursuant to URES A, commenced 
enforcement proceedings for duties of support, by filing Order to Show Cause (URES A) 
and Motion for Order to Show Cause (URESA), with the Third Judicial District Court. 
Both on their face refer to and include URESA. In addition, the District Court Cover 
Sheet, undated, under Nature of Suit, specifies that the suit is a Domestic Civil - UR 
URESA Action (New Case).8 
On May 20,1997, Constable Reitz of Salt Lake County, Utah, personally 
served, the Defendant at his employment address of 9355 South, 1300 East, Sandy, the 
Order to Show Cause (URESA) and Motion for Order to Show Cause (URESA).9 
A hearing on the Order to Show Cause pursuant to URESA, was held on 
June 25, 1997, before Commissioner Lisa Jones. 10 
The Commissioner, pursuant to Defendant's request for setting off 
arreareages, while taking into an account credits, that are legally permissible and/or any 
payments that he can legally substantiate, certified the matter of calculation of 
arreareages to sum certain, for an evidentiary hearing before the district court judge. 11 
An evidentiary hearing was held on October 8, 1997, before Honorable 
William H. Bohling, pursuant to URESA. The hearing was continued to December 
8 CIR and State of Utah's Legal Brief of 12/1/97, at pg. 2, #10, Exhibit G. It is 
Defendant's belief that Plaintiffs stated date of April 25, 1997, was a clerical mistake. 
See also R.T. of 12/8/97 at pg. 33, R.T. of 10/8/97 at pgs. 3, 10-11 & 25. 
9 CIR and State of Utah's Legal Brief of 12/1/97, at pg. 2, #11 & Exhibit H. 
1 0
 CIR, Minute Entry of 6/25/97 and State of Utah's Legal Brief of 12/1/97, at pg. 2, 
#12. 
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8,1997, the deadline for discovery was set for November 17, 1997 and briefs on legal 
issues raised by the Defendant were requested and submitted by both parties by 
December 1,1997.12 
On December 1,1997, the Defendant also submitted Motions for (a) 
Judicial Determination of Applicable Law and (b) Summary Judgment, respectfully 
requesting the Trial Court, as a matter of law, to issue an order for Summary Judgment 
granting the Defendant's application for setting off arreareages, while taking into an 
account; (i) the eight year Statute of Limitations of the State of Utah, (ii) finding that the 
Plaintiff is not entitled to arrearage for any alimony or spousal support from April 1987, 
forward and, (iii) finding that the Defendant is entitled to a 50% reduction in child 
support payments during the periods of extended visitation. 13 
Several briefs and replies were submitted by both parties subsequently. 14 
On October 29,1997, the State Of Utah, filed with the Trial Court, a 
second Motion and Order to Show Cause pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family 
Support Act (UIFSA), by filing the same exact copy of URESA petition filed to 
commence the action herein under URESA on May 12, 1997. The filing with the Court 
HR.T. of 6/25/97 at pgs. 3-6. 
1 2
 CIR, State of Utah's Legal Brief of 12/1/97, at pgs. 2-3, R.T. of 10/8/97 & 12/8/97 
and Scheduling Order of 11/20/97. 
13 CIR and Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant's Motions for Judicial 
Determination of Applicable Law and Summary Judgment of 12/1/97. 
1 4
 CIR, State of Utah's Legal Brief of 12/1/97, Defendant's Reply to State of Utah's 
Legal Brief of 12/12/97, State of Utah's Reply Brief of 12/19/97 and Defendant's 
Reply to State of Utah's Reply Brief of 1/5/98. 
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was on October 29,1997, the exact same day that Order to Show Cause (UIFSA), was 
scheduled and was heard by Commissioner Lisa Jones. 15 
The Defendant was never served with an Order to Show Cause 
(UIFSA).16 
The Defendant never appeared for a hearing scheduled for October 29, 
1997, and an Order of Default was entered. 17 
Evidentiary hearing was held on December 8, 1997. It was a continuance 
of the hearing held on October 8, 1997, pursuant to URESA.18 
At that hearing the Defendant stated that: 
a) He was never served with a second Order to Show Cause (UIFSA). 19 
b) State of Pennsylvania has a 6 year Statute of Limitations, applicable to the 
case herein.20 
c) Requested a pre trial conference to go over the payments made by the 
Defendant, that were not credited.21 
The Defendant, on December 8, 1997, in an open court, appearing in a 
limited capacity, specially only to object to the Courts jurisdiction for the second action 
15 CIR, Motion and Order to Show Cause (UIFSA) of 10/29/97 and R.T. of 10/29/97 at 
pgs. 2-3. 
16 CIR, R.T. of 12/8/97 at pgs. 36-37, Defendant's Reply to State of Utah's Reply Brief 
of 1/5/98 and Affidavit and Motion for Relief from Order and Dismissal of Action 
Pursuant to UIFSA of 1/21/98. 
17 CIR, R.T. of 10/29/97, at pgs. 2-3, R.T. of 12/8/97 at pgs. 36-37, Minute Entry of 
10/29/97, Order on Order to Show Cause filed on 11/21/97. 
1 8
 Scheduling Order of 11/20/97. 
19 R.T. of 12/8/97 at pgs. 36-37. 
20 R.T. of 12/8/97 at pgs. 39-40, 45-47. 
21 R.T. of 12/8/97 at pgs. 48. 
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commenced under UIFSA, stated that the service of process was fatally defective, as he 
was never served with a second Order to Show Cause (UIFSA).22 
On January 21, 1998, the Defendant, submitted a Motion for Relief from 
Order and Dismissal of Action Pursuant to UIFSA, requesting that the Trial Court issue 
an order, vacating the Order on Order to Show Cause, and dismissing proceedings 
pursuant to the petition for Order to Show Cause (UIFSA), due to fatal procedural 
defect.23 
On November 8, 1997, at 9:41 a.m., the Defendant, via Express Mail 
#EI817747289US, served the Plaintiff, Robin E. Kirby and her husband, Eric Femmer, 
with A. Alexander Jacoby's First Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of 
Documents.24 
To date, Robin E. Kirby and her husband, Eric Femmer have ignored, 
have not complied and have failed to reply to the Interrogatories and Request for 
Production of Documents. 
On January 12, 1998, the Defendant, submitted a Motion for Sanctions for 
Failure to Cooperate in Discovery, requesting the Trial Court issue an order, that (a) 
The Defendant has established that the Plaintiff has cohabited with a person of the 
22 R.T. of 12/8/97 at pgs. 36-37, Affidavit and Motion for Relief from Order and 
Dismissal of Action Pursuant to UIFSA of 1/21/98. 
23 CIR and Affidavit and Motion for Relief from Order and Dismissal of Action 
Pursuant to UIFSA of 1/21/98. 
24 CIR and Affidavit and Motion for Sanctions for Failure to Cooperate in Discovery of 
1/12/98. 
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opposite sex from May or June, 1986, (b) The Plaintiffs are prohibited from 
introducing into evidence any matters opposing Defendant's establishment of 
cohabitation, (c) The Plaintiffs are not entitled to arrearage for alimony or spousal 
support, after May or June, 1986, but as the arrearage for the periods of May 1986, 
through March 1987, was reduced to judgment by a Virginia Court, the Plaintiffs are 
not entitled to arrearage from April 1987, forward. 
Additionally, on January 13, 1998, pursuant to the Trial Court's request 
during a hearing on December 8, 1997,25 the Defendant submitted his proposed 
Summary Judgment, along with Judicial Findings and Determination of Applicable Law 
of even date. 
The Defendant in his Summary Judgment requested that the Judgment and 
Order be entered, granting the following relief;26 
1. "The Utah eight year Statue of Limitations to collecting arreareages applies, 
either under URESA or UIFSA, as it is the longer of the two and the effect of 
judgments obtained under either of the proceedings is identical 
2. The Plaintiff, is not entitled to collect any alimony or spousal support for the 
period the Plaintiff cohabited with a person of the opposite sex. Any order of 
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon 
establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is 
cohabiting with another person 
3. The Defendant, is entitled to 50% reduction in base child support obligation, 
for each child, for time periods during which the children were with him by 
order of the court or by written agreement of the parties for at least 25 of any 
30 consecutive days 
2 5
 R.T. of 12/8/97 atpgs. 47-48. 
26 Summary Judgment of 1/13/98. 
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The parties are directed to cooperate and to put forth a good faith effort in order 
to reach a stipulation agreement by February 15, 1998, disposive of the amount 
of outstanding arrears. Should any contested amounts remain, they are to be 
resolved by this Court during an Evidentiary hearing scheduled for 
, 1998." 
On January 16, 1998, the Plaintiffs also, submitted their proposed list of 
Findings and Conclusions of Law and Judgment and Order. 
The Plaintiffs "wish list" of requested relief was granted verbatim: 
1. "A Judgment shall enter against the Defendant and in favor of the State of 
Utah for the use and benefit of the initiating jurisdiction in the sum of 
$55,887.05, representing child support arrears for the period from December 
1985 through November 1997. 
2. The above judgment shall bear interest at the rate of 7.468 percent per annum. 
3. All support payments shall be made to the Office of Recovery Services, P.O. 
Box 45011, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0001, unless the Office gives written 
notice that payments should be sent elsewhere. 
4. Immediate and automatic income withholding shall apply for the collection is 
child support. 
5. The issue of the Defendant's contempt for failure to pay support continues to 
be certified for future hearing." 
The relief requested and granted by the Trial Court constitutes, represents 
and is conclusive of all the issues preserved by the Plaintiffs in the Trial Court, as to 
the amount of arrears, upon which execution against the Defendant may be issued. 
Disposition in the Trial Court 
The Defendant's Motions for (a) Summary Judgment, (b) For Sanctions 
for Failure to Cooperate in Discovery, and (c) For Relief from Order and Dismissal of 
Action Pursuant to UIFSA, were not ruled upon. 
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The Trial Court on February 4, 1998 held: 
" The issues presented to the Court are as follows: 
1. Does the Court have personal jurisdiction over the defendant? 
2. Should this Court apply the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act 
("UIFSA") when deciding this support enforcement action.? 
Based on the State's argument which the Court finds persuasive, the Court 
concludes that the defendant was properly served with both of the State's Order 
to Show Cause actions and this Court has jurisdiction over the defendant to hear 
this case. 
The Court also concludes that the applicable law for the case is Utah's UIFSA 
statute. 
Finally, the Court concludes that in an enforcement of support action UIFSA 
provides that the longest statute of limitations applies to the action, and further 
concludes that the State of Pennsylvania has no statute of limitations on the 
period of recovery. Accordingly, since Pennsylvania law has no statute of 
limitations, its law governs this action, and in the absence of any statute of 
limitations, a Judgment should enter against the defendant for all the past due 
support amounts. 
Having made the foregoing ruling, based on the record and briefs before the 
Court, the Court enters the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and the 
Judgment and Order, submitted by the State with its January 13, 1998 notice, as 
accurately reflecting the foregoing ruling." 
The Plaintiffs Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Judgment 
and Order of January 16, 1998, were granted verbatim by the Trial Court on February 4, 
1998. 
The Judgment and Order of February 4, 1998, of the Trial Court reduced 
the arreareages to sum certain, without a prerequisite hearing. 
The Defendant was not given an opportunity to present the evidence for 
the disputed amounts of the payments that were not credited. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties to the action are ex-husband and wife. The Defendant has a 
duty of Support for Plaintiff, Pursuant to Virginia Divorce Decree, of July 24, 1987. 
The Defendant in the action is A. Alexander Jacoby, pro se, who was 
unrepresented throughout the proceedings.27 The Plaintiffs in the action are State of 
Utah, Department of Human Service, ex rel., State of Pennsylvania, ex rel., Robin E. 
Kirby, represented by Renee M. Jimenez, Esq., Assistant Attorney General. 
The Defendant has been a Utah resident since June, 1986, while the 
Plaintiff has been a Massachusetts resident since June, 1992.28 
The Defendant is a physician. He is unmarried. The Plaintiff is a 
physician, married to Eric Femmer. 
The parties were married on June 13, 1980 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 
and were divorced on July 24, 1987 by a Divorce Decree of the Circuit Court of 
Chesterfield County, Virginia.29 
The Divorce Decree merged and incorporated the Property Settlement 
Agreement the parties entered into on January 5, 1987.30 
27 The Defendant's request for appointment of counsel was improperly denied by the 
Trial Court. See R.T. of 10/8/97 at pg. 13. See also Boggs v. Boggs, 824 P.2d 478, 
481(Utah Ct. App. 1991) and Hicks on behalf of Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 642 (1988) 
and Lasted v. Dep't of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981). Nothing herein contained 
should be viewed as a waiver of the Defendant's right and desire of appointment of 
counsel in the event of contempt proceedings. 
28 R.T . of 6/25/97 at pg. 4 and R.T. of 10/8/97 at pg. 14. 
29 state of Utah's Legal Brief of 12/1/97 #3 at pg. 2, Exhibit C. 
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Two children were born of the marriage: Adrienne Leigh Jacoby, age 17, 
born on December 2, 1980 and Olivia Ross Jacoby, age 16, born on March 12, 1982. 
The amount of periodic spousal and child support was never modified by 
judicial decree, and is payable in two equal installments on the 5 ^ and 2 0 ^ days of 
each month.31 
The Defendant was current with his Court ordered support payments until 
July 1986, when he commenced his residency training at the University of Utah.32 The 
Defendant, on a resident's salary was unable to meet support obligations as they came 
due and fell into arrears. 
The arrears as of March 27, 1987 in the amount of $8,200.00, were 
reduced to Judgment by Virginia Court.33 
From April 1987, forward, the initiating state has not determined the 
amount of arrears or reduced child support arrears under its order to judgment.34 
Defendant's children were never charges of the State, or supported 
pursuant to Aid to Families with Dependent Children's Program (AFDQ.35 
30 state of Utah's Legal Brief of 12/1/97 #3 at pg. 2, Exhibit C 
31 State of Utah's Legal Brief of 12/1/97 #3 & #8 at pg. 2, Exhibit C. 
32R.T. of 10/8/97 at pg. 27. 
33 State of Utah's Legal Brief of 12/1/97 #6 at pg. 2, Exhibit E. 
34 state of Utah's Legal Brief of 12/1/97 #8 at pg. 2. 
35 State of Utah's Reply Brief of 12/19/97 at pgs. 5-6. 
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Enforcement proceedings for duties of support, for dependent children, 
upon foreign judgment, in this case were commenced pursuant to Uniform Reciprocal 
Enforcement of Support Act ("URESA") on May 12,1997. 
The State of Utah had enacted Uniform Interstate Family Support Act 
(UIFSA), effective April 29,1996 which was amended effective July 1,1997.36 
The State of Pennsylvania had enacted Uniform Interstate Family Support 
Act (UIFSA), effective April 4,1996. 
The State of Utah had repealed Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of 
Support Act ("URESA") effective July 1,1997. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement Support Act (URESA) is controlling, 
as the action was commenced pursuant to URESA. As URESA was repealed 
effective July 1, 1997, the proceedings shall be conformed to UIFSA as far as 
consistent. UI FSA is controlling, if and only if application of UIFSA will 
affect only procedural and not vested, unalterable substantive rights of 
the parties, otherwise URESA is controlling. Stated differently, UIFSA will 
affect only procedural and not vested, unalterable substantive rights of 
the parties, if and only if this Honorable Court finds as a matter of law that 
the State of Utah Statute of Limitations, applicable to the case herein, is the 
same or longer than that of the State Of Pennsylvania, since only under that 
scenario effect of judgments obtained under either of the proceedings is 
identical. 
2. For the proceedings pursuant to UIFSA, the Trial Court had never acquired 
the prerequisite personal and subject matter jurisdictions necessary for a valid 
Court Order or Judgment, as the service of process was fatally defective. The 
Order of Default, Order on Order to Show Cause filed on November 11,1997 
is null and void. 
36 state of Utah's Legal Brief of 12/1/97 at pg. 10. 
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3. The laws of the State of Utah govern, either under URESA or UIFSA, as the 
Defendant has been domiciled and residing in the State of Utah during the 
periods of controversy. URESA is controlling, as the action was commenced 
pursuant to URESA. But as URESA was repealed effective July 1, 1997, the 
proceedings shall be conformed to UIFSA as far as consistent with the 
vested, unalterable substantive rights of the parties. 
4. A review of the applicable statutory provisions and case law clearly and 
convincingly supports the conclusion that the State of Pennsylvania has a six 
year Statute of Limitations applicable to the case herein and the Utah eight 
year Statue of Limitations to collecting arrearages applies, either under 
URESA or UIFSA, as it is the longer of the two and the effect of the 
judgments obtained under either of the proceedings is identical. Accordingly, 
execution against the Defendant may be issued only for the arrearages 
accumulated within a period of eight years prior to commencement of the 
action herein, i.e. only arrears from May 20,1989, the periodic installment 
due date, forward remain, the rest are time barred. 
5. The Plaintiff, is not entitled to collect alimony or spousal support for the 
period the Plaintiff cohabited with a person of the opposite sex. Any order of 
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon 
establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is 
cohabiting with another person. As the arrearage for a period from May 1986 
through March 1987 was reduced to judgment by Virginia Court, the Plaintiff 
is not entitled to alimony or spousal support from April 1987, forward. 
6. The Defendant, is entitled to 50% reduction in base child support obligation, 
for each child, for time periods during which the children were with the 
noncustodial parent by order of the court or by written agreement of the 
parties for at least 25 of any 30 consecutive days. Child support obligation 
should be adjusted accordingly. 
7. The Defendant, is entitled to present the evidence for the disputed amounts of 
the payments that were not credited, before the Trial Court, as mandated by 
the Due Process Clause of the United States and Utah Constitutions. 
ARGUMENTS 
1. Whether, the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement Support Act (URESA) is 
controlling, as the action herein was commenced pursuant to URESA, but as 
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URESA was repealed effective July 1,1997, whether, from July 1,1997, forward, 
the proceedings shall be conformed to Uniform Interstate Family Support Act 
(UIFSA), as far as consistent with the vested, unalterable substantive rights of the 
parties? 
The Trial Court erred in not ruling upon the Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, and in finding that UIFSA is controlling, as application of 
UIFSA in combination with the finding, that the State of Pennsylvania has no Statute 
of Limitations applicable to the case herein, will affect both procedural and vested, 
unalterable substantive rights of the parties. 
The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) was 
drafted and approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws in 1950. At the time of its approval, it was a revolutionary act, providing for the 
establishment and enforcement of support orders across state lines. A custodial parent 
could file a petition in State 1 which would be forwarded to State 2, where the obligor 
resided or owned property. Therefore, there was no requirement that the custodial 
parent travel to the distant forum of the obligor. Instead, a government attorney -
usually a prosecutor - appeared on the obligee's behalf in the responding state. If the 
responding state concluded that the obligor had a duty of support it would establish a 
support amount, enforce the order, and forward support payments to the obligee in the 
initiating state. 
URESA was amended in 1952 and 1956, and substantially revised in 
1968. Often the 1968 version of URESA is referred to by the acronym (R)URESA or 
23 
RURESA. For purposes of the discussion herein, all versions of the Act will be referred 
to as URESA. 
Pursuant to URESA, an obligee can establish paternity, establish a support 
duty, enforce an existing support order for both arrears and ongoing support, seek a new 
order in a higher amount, and register a foreign support order in a second state. Many 
states allow URESA to be used when both parties live in the same state but reside in 
different counties. 
All states of the Union, the District of Columbia, American Samoa, the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands have enacted URESA or 
an act substantially similar to it. Throughout the states, URESA is a uniform act whose 
name is a misnomer. In enacting URESA, states have enacted different versions of it, 
have deleted or added provisions, or have enacted substantially similar acts. 
Since URESA was enacted prior to the enactment of Title IV-D of the 
Social Security Act, 42 USC § 651 et seq., it makes no reference to the IV-D program. 
In actuality, however, Title IV-D affects almost every aspect of how a URESA case is 
handled. Many states are now requiring that all URESA petitioners proceed through the 
IV-D system. A IV-D requirement ensures that the state can collect federal financial 
incentives on support payments collected and federal financial participation money for 
any administrative expenses incurred. 
Irrespective of the version of URESA a state has enacted, there are four 
basic terms used consistently. 
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1. "Obligee" means any person to whom a duty of support is owed and a state or 
political subdivision thereof. 
2. "Obligor" means any person owing a duty of support. 
3. "Initiating State" means any state in which a proceeding pursuant to this or a 
substantially similar reciprocal law is commenced. 
4. "Responding State" means the state in which any responsive proceeding is 
heard. 
All proceedings under URES A require initiation of a proceeding in the 
initiating state through filing a petition or request for registration that is forwarded to 
the appropriate entity in the responding state. Therefore, URESA is always a two-state 
act. 
The initiating court must certify that the URESA petition sets forth facts 
upon which the responding court may determine that the obligor owes a duty of support 
and that the responding court may obtain jurisdiction over the obligor or the obligor's 
property. The URESA petition must be verified and contain information about the 
obligee, the obligor, and the persons for whom support is sought. Federal regulations 
require IV-D cases to use federally designed interstate forms. The responding state's 
law governs service of process on the obligor. 
In the proceedings pursuant to "URESA" the law of the responding state 
governs determination of a support duty. However, if the obligor was present in another 
state during the time that support is sought, the other state's laws apply regarding the 
obligor's duty of support. 
The duty of support under URESA includes the duty to pay arrears. In 
any hearing before the responding court under the civil provisions of URESA, the court 
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must follow the rules of evidence applicable in a civil action. URESA allows an appeal 
from a responding court's order, subject to rules of appellate procedure. 
With the passage of time, it became clear, that, though URESA was a 
major milestone at its time, it had significant shortcomings, and in order to better serve 
the needs of our highly mobile society, URESA required a thorough overhaul. Instead 
of an overhaul, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 
drafted the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA). In order to ensure that the 
UIFSA is truly a uniform act, unlike URESA, the Congress in July 1996, pursuant to the 
U.S. Commission on Interstate Child Support recommendation, passed HR 3734, which 
required, that all states, as a condition of receiving IV-D funds, enact UIFSA verbatim 
and have in effect, by January 1, 1998, the UIFSA, "as approved by the American Bar 
Association on February 9, 1993, together with any amendments officially adopted 
before January 1, 1998 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws."37 
The State of Pennsylvania had enacted UIFSA, effective April 4,1996.38 
The State of Utah had enacted UIFSA, effective April 29,1996, which was amended 
37 For general information see: Enforcing Child & Spousal Support, M.F. Dobbs & 
M.C. Haynes, Clark, Boardman, Callaghan, Publishers, (1996), Brockelbank & 
Infausto, Interstate Enforcement of Family Support (2d Ed 1971), and The Uniform 
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, in Haynes with Dodson, eds., U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Service, Interstate Child Support Remedies (1989). 
38 Enforcing Child & Spousal Support, M.F. Dobbs & M.C. Haynes, Cumulative 
Supplement, § 6:89, pg. 117, Clark, Boardman, Callaghan, Publishers, (1996). 
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effective July 1,1997.39 In amending UIFSA, effective July 1, 1997, the State of Utah 
repealed URESA.40 
In the case herein, the relevant URESA statutes are those of the State of 
Utah and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.41 
Enforcement proceedings for duties of support, upon foreign judgment, in 
this case were commenced pursuant URESA. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania filed 
a URESA petition for enforcement on March 20, 1997, by forwarding it to the State of 
Utah,42 the Defendant's domicile and residence, since June, 1986.43 
Utah legislature enacted one of the earlier versions of URESA, while 
Pennsylvania enacted 1968, revised Act, i.e. RURESA. URESA in Utah is governed by 
U.C.A. § 77-31-1 et seq., and RURESA in Pennsylvania is governed by 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 
4501 etseq. 
The purpose of URESA, was codified in U.C.A. § 77-37-1,44 and was 
interpreted by Utah Appellate Court in Charlesworth v. State of Cal.. 793 P.2d 411,413 
(UtahApp. 1990): 
"to improve and extend by reciprocal legislation the enforcement of duties of 
support. The goal sought by this legislation is to provide a prompt, expeditious 
3 9
 U.C.A. § 78-45f-100 et seq., R.T. of 12/8/97 at pg. 34. 
4 0
 U.C.A. §77-31-1 etseq. 
41 UIFSA statutes are uniform. 
4 2
 CIR, State of Utah's Legal Brief of 12/1/97, Exhibit M, R.T. of 12/8/97 at pg. 33, 
but see also R.T. of 10/8/97 at pgs. 3, 10-11, 25. 
4 3
 R.T. of 6/25/97 at pg. 4, and R.T. of 10/8/97 at pg. 14. 
4 4
 "The purpose of this act is to improve and extend by reciprocal legislation and 
enforcement of duties of support and to make uniform the law with respect thereto". 
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way of enforcing the duty to support minor children without getting the parties 
involved in other complex, collateral issues. Patterson v. Patterson, 2 Kan. 
App.2d 447, 581 P.2d 824, 825 (1978) (citation omitted)." 
URESA was repealed, effective July 1, 1997. The Plaintiffs argued and 
the Trial Court held that UIFSA is controlling. 
It is undisputed that the action in the case sub judicae was commenced on 
May 12, 1997, pursuant to URESA.45 The Plaintiffs, at that time, had four different 
options available to them, by which to institute the claim against the Defendant, for 
enforcement proceedings arising out of support duty: 
a) Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA). 
b) Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA). 
c) Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgment Acts (UEFJA). 
d) The registration proceedings either under URESA or UIFSA. 
It is undisputed that both URESA and UIFSA were in effect and "in place 
at the time".46 The Plaintiffs had the opportunity to choose any one of the above 
options, and on May 12, 1997, they chose to commence proceedings under URESA. 
The Plaintiffs with their Choice of Law, have forsaken certain rights, while accruing 
others. It must be noted that only after an affirmative defense of the Statute of 
Limitations was raised by the Defendant, did the Plaintiffs in October 1997, decided to 
proceed under UIFSA, as well. At that late time in the proceedings, the Plaintiffs were 
not precluded from proceeding solely under UIFSA, and could have easily 
45 CIR, State of Utah's Legal Brief of 12/1/97, pg. 2, #10 & Exhibit G,, R.T. of 
10/8/97 at pgs. 3, 10-11, 25, and R.T. of 12/8/97 at pg. 33. 
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accomplished that, should they have so chosen. Instead, they proceeded under both 
causes of action. 
Additionally, Plaintiffs, are free to file motions on a daily basis under 
any or all of the options available to them, subject to compliance with the due process of 
the law requirements and fundamental legal principle of "first in time, first in line." 
Each of the Plaintiffs petitions, including Second Order to Show Cause, (UIFSA) will 
be dealt with by the Defendant, in its due course, when legally perfected and mature, 
and after proper service and scheduling with the Trial Court and no sooner. In the 
interim, it is undisputed, that this action was commenced under then effective URESA 
statutes and has to be narrowly construed in that light. 
The Plaintiffs, recognize that: 
"Encompassed in the present controversy are the issues of what statute of 
limitations is applicable for taking of judgments and the amount of support 
arrears owed by the Defendant. Additionally, there is an issue of what Utah law 
is applicable for enforcement and finally, there is an issue of what, if any, credits 
the Defendant is entitled to against the support arrearage".47 
And: 
"While it is true that under URESA Utah's eight year statute of limitations 
would apply, under UIFSA, the State with the longest statute of limitations 
controls."48 
4 6
 State of Utah's Legal Brief at pg. 10 and R.T. of 12/8/97 at pgs. 33-34. 
4 7
 State of Utah's Legal Brief of 12/1/97, at pg. 8. 
4 8
 State of Utah's Reply Brief of 12/19/97, at pg. 5, emphasis added. 
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The Plaintiffs are incorrect in arguing and the Trial Court is incorrect in 
holding that UIFSA is controlling: 
"It is merely a technicality that the first Order to Show Cause was filed under 
URESA and not UIFSA Thus, because UIFSA has the same intent as 
URESA in enforcement actions but is simply a more streamlined approach, it is a 
procedural statute that should be applied retroactively in this case."49 
The Plaintiffs and by inference the Trial Court's reliance on Pilcher v. 
State Department of Social Service, 663 P.2d 450 (Utah 1983), to buttress their holding, 
is misplaced. The Pilcher Court, in limited cases, for the statutes which affect only 
procedural and not substantive rights of the parties, carved out an exception in a 
general rule against retroactive application of the statutes. Application of UIFSA, will 
affect both procedural and substantive rights of the parties, should this Honorable Court 
find as a matter of law that Pennsylvania has no Statute bf Limitations applicable to the 
case herein. 
The relevant Utah Code Annotated statutes provide that: 
§ 68-2-6. Accrued rights not affected by repeal. 
This repeal of existing statues shall not affect any act done, any right accruing or 
which has accrued or has been established, or any suit or proceeding had or 
commenced in any civil cause before the time when such repeal takes effect; but 
the proceedings in such cases shall be conformed to the provisions of these 
revised statues as far as consistent. (Emphasis added) 
§ 68-2-7. Effect on limitation of actions. 
4 9
 State of Utah's Reply Brief of 12/19/97, at pg. 10, emphasis added. 
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When a limitation or period of time prescribed in any existing statute for 
acquiring a right or barring a remedy, or for any other purpose, has begun to run 
before these revised statutes go into effect, and the same or any other limitation 
is prescribed in these revised statutes, the time which has already run shall be 
deemed a part of the time prescribed as such limitation by these revised statutes. 
§ 68-2-9. Effect on suits and prosecutions pending. 
No suit or prosecution, pending when this repeal takes effect, for an offense 
committed, or for the recovery of a penalty or forfeiture incurred, shall be 
affected by the repeal, but the proceedings may be conformed to the provisions of 
these revised statutes as far as consistent. (Emphasis added) 
§68-3-5. Effect of repeal. 
The repeal of a statute does not revive a statute previously repealed, or affect any 
right which has accrued, any duty imposed, any penalty incurred, or any action 
or proceeding commenced under or by virtue of the statute repealed. 
§ 68-3-3. Retroactive effect. 
No part of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so declared. 
(Emphasis added). 
The Supreme Court of Utah had an opportunity to interpret the above 
statutes in Roark v. Crabtree, 893 P.2d 1058, 1061-1062 (Utah 1995): 
""It is a long-standing rule of statutory construction that a legislative enactment 
which alters the substantive law or affects vested rights will not be read to 
operate retrospectively unless the legislature has clearly expressed that 
intention." (citations omitted). This rule of construction is codified in Utah Code 
Ann. § 68-3-3.. ..There is a recognized exception to the general rule against 
retroactivity for statutes which are procedural in nature. Pilcher v. State, 663 
P.2d 450, 455 (Utah 1983). However, this exception has been narrowly construed 
to permit retroactive application "where a statute changes only procedural law by 
providing a different mode or form of procedure for enforcing substantive 
rights," id., and to prohibit retroactivity when a statute enlarges, eliminates, or 
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destroys vested or contractual rights. (Citations omitted). Consequently, the 
question before us is whether the defense of statute of limitations is a vested 
right This court first examined retroactive revival of a time-barred civil action 
in Ireland v. Mackintosh, 22 Utah 296, 61 P. 901 (1900)....In a unanimous 
opinion, this court held that subsequent passage of an act increasing the period of 
limitation could not operate to affect or renew a cause of action already barred. 
Specifically, the court stated that when the plaintiffs right of action "became 
barred under the previous statute, the respondent acquired a vested right, in this 
state, to plead that statute as a defense and bar to the action." In refusing to 
allow the revival of time-barred claims through retroactive application of 
extended statutes of limitations, this court has chosen to follow the majority rule. 
(Citations omitted). The great preponderance of authority favors the view that 
one who has become released from a demand by the operation of the statute of 
limitations is protected against its revival by a change in the limitation law." 51 
Am.Jur.2d Limitation of Actions § 44 (1970). Accordingly, "after a cause of 
action has become barred by the statute of limitations the defendant has a vested 
right to rely on that statute as a defense...which cannot be taken away by 
legislation.. .or by affirmative act, such as lengthening of the limitation period." 
Id. (emphasis added)". 
WHEREFORE, URESA is controlling, as the action was commenced 
pursuant to URESA. As URESA was repealed effective July 1, 1997, the proceedings 
shall be conformed to UIFSA as far as consistent. UI FSA is controlling, if and only if 
application of UIFSA will affect only procedural and not vested, unalterable 
substantive rights of the parties, otherwise URESA is controlling. Stated differently, 
UIFSA will affect only procedural and not vested, unalterable substantive rights of 
the parties, if and only if this Honorable Court finds as a matter of law that the State of 
Utah Statute of Limitations, applicable to the case herein, is the same or longer than 
that of the State Of Pennsylvania, since only under that scenario effect of judgments 
obtained under either of the proceedings is identical. 
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2. Whether for the proceedings pursuant to UIFSA, the Trial Court acquired the 
prerequisite personal and subject matter jurisdictions necessary for a valid Court 
Order or Judgment? 
The Trial Court erred in finding that the Trial Court, acquired the 
prerequisite personal and subject matter jurisdictions necessary for a valid Court 
Order or Judgment and in not ruling upon the Defendant's Motion for Relief from 
Order and Dismissal of Action Pursuant to JJIFSA. 
a) Whether the prerequisite subject matter jurisdiction was conferred on the Trial 
Court, as the petition for commencement of the action pursuant to JJIFSA, is fatally 
defective? 
In order to issue a valid order or judgment, a court must have jurisdiction 
over both the subject matter of the action and the parties. Subject-matter jurisdiction is 
the court's power to hear and determine the general subject involved in the action. 
While a party may voluntarily submit to the personal jurisdiction of the court, subject-
matter jurisdiction is derived from the constitution and the laws, and cannot be 
conferred by agreement, consent, or waiver of the parties. 
Commencement of the action, under UIFSA, requires submission of a 
particular set of documents which the State of Pennsylvania and subsequently the State 
of Utah have not complied with. 
UIFSA Statute, U.C.A. § 78-45f-311 sets forth that: 
(2) The petition must specify the relief sought. The petition and the 
accompanying documents must conform substantially with the requirements 
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imposed by the forms mandated by federal law for use in cases filed by a support 
enforcement agency. 
UIFSA action was commenced by the Plaintiffs by filing the same exact 
copy of URESA petition, that was filed to commence the action herein under URESA 
on May 12, 1997. 5 0 
On Child Support Enforcement Transmittal, the Plaintiffs indicated by 
checking a pre-printed box that the requested action was: Income Withholding, 
Collection of Arrears (URESA or UEFJA), Enforcement of Existing Order (URESA), 
Other: Reopen. 
Additionally, the Plaintiffs in their State of Utah's Legal Brief of 12/1/97 
at page 7 state that: 
"When the referring state requests support enforcement services, it sends the 
responding state a request transmittal. The transmittal determines what actions 
the referring state would like the responding state to take on a case and defines 
the responding state's actions. The responding state does not have statutory 
authority to take actions not requested by a referring state". (Emphasis 
added). 
The Plaintiffs, to date, are in non-compliance with the mandatory 
pleading requirements necessary to commence an action pursuant to UIFSA. 
WHEREFORE, the prerequisite subject matter jurisdiction was never 
conferred on the Trial Court, as the petition for commencement of the action pursuant to 
UIFSA, is fatally defective. 
5 0
 CIR, Motion and Order to Show Cause (UIFSA) of 10/29/97 and R.T. of 10/29/97. 
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b) Whether, the prerequisite subject matter jurisdiction was conferred on the Trial 
Court, pursuant to UIFSA, during a hearing, on December 8,1997, as to date, 
UIFSA action, has not been scheduled for a hearing? 
Evidentiary hearing held on December 8, 1997, was a continuance of the 
hearing held on October 8, 1997, pursuant to URESA action of May 12, 1997.51 
UIFSA action was commenced on October 29, 1997, subsequent to 
October 8, 1997, hearing. 
To date, no hearing date is scheduled with the Trial Court on a UIFSA 
action. 
WHEREFORE, during an evidentiary hearing on December 8, 1997, the 
Trial Court had no prerequisite subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to UIFSA, as the 
UIFSA action was not before the Trial Court for adjudication. 
Nor, for action commenced under UIFSA, subject matter jurisdiction was 
conferred on the Trial Court, when the Defendant appeared only in a limited capacity, 
and not as a general appearance, specially only to object to the Courts jurisdiction, due 
to a fatally defective service of process, as the Defendant was never served. 
c) Whether, due to fatally defective service of process of the UIFSA action, the 
prerequisite personal jurisdiction over the Defendant was conferred on the Trial 
Court? 
51 Scheduling Order of 11/20/97. 
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The Plaintiffs argued and the Trial Court held, without the necessary 
evidentiary hearing, that on October 22, 1997, the Defendant was properly served with 
an Order to Show Cause filed under UIFSA. That argument is factually incorrect, as the 
Defendant was never served with an Order to Show Cause (UIFSA). 
On October 22, 1997, the Defendant was personally served by Mr. 
Maxwell, but only with an Affidavit of Ms. Annice Valdez, and not with an Order to 
Show Cause (UIFSA).52 
The Defendant never appeared for a hearing scheduled on October 29, 
1997, and an Order of Default was entered. 
As the proof, the Plaintiffs offered the Return of Service from Constable 
Collins5 office. 
It is of note that the Return of Service was filed with the Trial Court, 
during a hearing on October 29, 1997. 53 The Attorney of Record for the Plaintiffs, 
Renee M. Jimenez, during a hearing,_hand delivered the said Return of Service to the 
Commissioner Lisa Jones. 
Moreover, the Order to Show Cause (UIFSA) was filed with the Trial 
Court the day of the hearing, on October 29, 1997, as well.54 
Mr. Maxwell's endorsement of the Order to Show Cause (UIFSA), on its 
face and the Return of Service, are inconsistent and contradictory to each other. Order 
5 2
 Defendant's Reply to State of Utah's Reply Brief of 1/5/98, Exhibit 1. 
53R.T. of 10/29/97 at pg. 2. 
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to Show Cause (UIFSA), endorsed by Mr. Maxwell, states that the Defendant was 
served at his employment address: 9355 South 1300 East, while the Return of Service 
provides the address of: "2318 Oakcrest Dr."55 jhe Defendant was not served at his 
residence on that day. The Defendant was served at his work. He was served with an 
Affidavit of Ms. Annice Valdez, and not with an Order to Show Cause (UIFSA). 
Additionally, the Affidavit of Ms. Annice Valdez, filed with the Court, is not endorsed 
by Mr. Maxwell, while true and correct copy submitted by the Defendant to the Trial 
Court is endorsed by Mr. Maxwell. 
It is the Defendant's belief that Mr. Maxwell made unintentional and 
unfortunate mistake, by serving the Defendant with the affidavit of Ms. Annice Valdez 
and not with a second Order to Show Cause (UIFSA). An honest mistake is a mistake 
nevertheless, that substantially affects the rights of the person served, invalidating the 
process of service. 
Additionally, Service of Process on October 22, 1997, for a hearing 
scheduled for October 29, 1997, falls woefully short on letter and meaning of due notice 
provision of the United States and Utah Constitutions. 
During an evidentiary hearing, on December 8, 1997, a hearing scheduled 
with the Trial Court, pursuant to URESA, the Defendant had a limited appearance under 
UIFSA. The Defendant promptly objected to the Trial Court's jurisdiction and on 
54 CIR and Order to Show Cause (UIFSA) of 10/29/97. 
55 The Defendant resides at 2317 Oakcrest Lane. 
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January 21, 1998, the Defendant submitted Motion and Affidavit for Relief from Order 
and Dismissal of Action Pursuant to UIFSA.56 
The motion was not ruled upon by the Trial Court. To date, evidentiary 
hearing, to address the affirmative defenses and contested issues raised by the 
defendant, is not is scheduled. 
WHEREFORE, for the proceedings pursuant to UIFSA, the Trial Court 
had never acquired the prerequisite personal and subject matter jurisdictions necessary 
for a valid Court Order or Judgment. The Order of Default, Order on Order to Show 
Cause filed on November 11,1997 is null and void. 
3. Whether the governing law is that of the State where the obligor was present 
during the period for which support is sought? 
The laws of the State of Utah govern, either under URESA or UIFSA, as the 
Defendant has been domiciled and residing in the State of Utah during the periods of 
controversy. 
The Choice of Law, pursuant to either URESA or UIFSA, governing the 
proceedings, is of the State where the obligor was present during the periods in 
question. URESA, makes no special allowance for Statute of Limitations i.e. mere 
presence of obligor, for the periods in question, invokes that states Statute of 
56 R.T. of 12/8/97 at pgs. 36-37 and Motion and Affidavit for Relief from Order and 
Dismissal of Action Pursuant to UIFSA of 1/21/98. 
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Limitations.57 UIFSA on the other hand does make special allowances for applicable 
Statute of Limitations. 
U.C.A. § 78-45f-604. Choice of Law 
(1) The law of the issuing state governs the nature, extent, amount, and duration 
of current payments and other obligations of support and the payment of 
arrearages under the order. 
(2) In a proceeding for arrearages, the statute of limitations under the laws of this 
state or of the issuing state, whichever is longer, applies. 
The Choice of Law in Utah, pursuant to URESA, is set forth in U.C.A. § 
77-31-7: 
"Duties of support applicable under this act are those imposed or imposable 
under the laws of any state where the obligor was present during the period for 
which support is sought. The obligor is presumed to have been present in the 
responding state during the period for which support is sought until otherwise 
shown". . 5 8 
The mere presence of the Obligor in any state for the period during which 
support is sought imposes the laws of that state, as they relate to support proceedings. 
The Supreme Court of Utah in Lamberth v. Lamberth, 550 P.2d 200, 202 
(Utah 1976), stated that: 
"In this action for support under the statute referred to, and the parties being 
before the court, the general jurisdiction and powers, including the equity powers 
57 U.C.A. §77-31-7. 
58 Pennsylvania has similar provision in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4507 for the Choice of Law: 
"Duties of support applicable under this chapter are those imposed under the laws of 
any state where the obligor was present for the period during which support is sought. 
The obligor is presumed to have been present in the responding state during the period 
for which support is sought until otherwise shown". 
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of our district court, were invoked. See Sec. 7, Art. VIII, Utah Const. The 
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act provides: 
"Duties of support applicable under this act are those imposed or 
imposable under the laws of any state where the obligor was present 
during the period for which support is sought.. .Sec. 77-6la-7, U.C.A. 
1953". 
Since the obligor (Defendant) was present in this State during the period for 
which support is sought, the duty of support and the extent thereof were 
properly determined by the district court under the laws of Utah". Id., 
(Emphasis added). 
This is currently the view of the majority, if not all of the jurisdictions that 
have adopted URESA or RURESA. See: 
Schilz v. Superior Court. 144 Ariz 65, 695 P2d 1103 (Arizona 1995), Kaplan v. 
Kaplan. 167 AD2d 652, 563 NYS2d 241 (New York 1990), Landis v. Kolskv. 81 
NJ 430, 409 A2d 276 (New Jersey 1979). Rimsans v. Rimsans. 261 NJ Super 
214, 618 A2d 854 (New Jersey 1992), Government of Virgin Islands v. Lorillard. 
358 F2d 172 (United States CA3 1966), In re marriage of Alper. 116 Cal App 3d 
925, 172 Cal Rptr 402 (California 1981), Mazzocco v. Mazzocco. 378 Mass App 
796, 392 NE2d 852 (Massachusetts 1970), St. George v. St. George. 304 NW2d 
640 (Minnesota 1981), Benzing v. Benzing. 104 NM 129, 717 P2d 105 (New 
Mexico 1986), Mullis v. Mullis. 669 P2d 763 (Oklahoma 1983), Cordie v. Tank. 
538 NW2d 214 (North Dakota ND 1995), In re Lurie. 33 Cal App 4 * 658, 39 
Cal Rptr 2d 835 (California 1995), Contra Costa County ex rel. Petersen v. 
Petersen. 234 Neb 418, 451 NW2d 390 (Nebraska 1990), Oklahoma Dept. of 
Human Services ex rel. Pavlovich v. Pavlovich, 22 Fam L Rep 1381 (United 
States 1996), Kammersell v. Kammersell. 792 P2d 496 (Utah App 1990), 
Charlesworth v. State of California. 793 P2d 411 (Utah App 1990), Qglesbv v. 
Qglesbv. 29 Utah 2d 419, 510 P2d 1106 (Utah 1973), Rohr v. Rohr. 709 P2d 382 
(Utah 1985), Lamberth v. Lamberth. 550 P2d 200 (Utah 1976), Mancini v. 
Mancini. 136 Vt231, 388 A2d 414 (Vermont 1978). 
See also: 
Transylvania County Dept. of Social Services o/b/o Dowling v. Connolly, 115 
NC App 34, 443 SE2d (North Carolina 1994), rev den 337 NC 806, 449 SE2d 
758 (1994) (if issuing state has not reduced child support arrears under its 
order to judgment or determined amount of arrears, responding court has 
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authority to determine amount of arrears, giving credit to obligor for any 
payments that he can prove were made under order). 
WHEREFORE, the laws of the State of Utah govern, either under URESA 
or UIFSA, as the Defendant has been domiciled and residing in the State of Utah during 
the periods of controversy. URESA is controlling, as the action was commenced 
pursuant to URESA. But as URESA was repealed effective July 1, 1997, the 
proceedings shall be conformed to UIFSA as far as consistent with the vested, 
unalterable substantive rights of the parties. 
4. Whether the Utah eight year Statute of Limitations to collecting arrearages 
applies, either under URESA or UIFSA, as it is the longer of the two and the effect 
of judgments obtained under either of the proceedings is identical? 
The Trial Court erred in finding that the State of Pennsylvania has no 
Statute of Limitations for the recovery of child support, and as there is no question of 
fact, but of law, the Defendants motion for Summary Judgment, setting arrearages 
according to the State of Utah eight year Statute of Limitations was improperly not 
ruled upon. 
Statute of Limitations in Utah 
In the State of Utah, Limitations of Actions are governed by Title 78, 
Chapter 12 of U.C.A. The time, in general, for commencement of actions is set forth in 
U.C.A.§ 78-12-1: 
"civil actions may be commenced only within the periods prescribed in this 
chapter, after the cause of action has accrued, except in specific cases where a 
different limitation is prescribed by statute". 
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The controlling statute governing enforcement of liability for Duties of 
Support is pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-12-22: 
An action may be brought within eight years: 
1) upon a judgment or decree of any court of the United States, or of any state 
or territory within the United States; 
2) to enforce any liability due or to become due, for failure to provide support 
or maintenance for dependent children. 
In Nixon v. Salt Lake City Corp., 898 P.2d 265, 268 (Utah 1995) the 
Supreme Court of Utah stated the rules of statutory interpretation: 
"the best evidence of the legislature's intent is the plain meaning of the statute". 
The Supreme Court of Utah in Passey v. Budge 85 Utah 37, 38 P.2d 712, 
716-717 (Utah 1934), stated that: 
"It must be remembered that the statute of limitations is a legal, and not an 
equitable, defense. It is available, regardless of the equities, if the facts are such 
as to warrant the interposition of the plea". 
The controlling case is Seeley v. Park, 532 P.2d 684 (Utah 1975), where 
the Supreme Court of Utah stated: 
"The statute provides that an action upon a judgment of any court of any state 
within the United States must be commenced within eight years from the time it 
becomes final. Sections 78-12-1 and 78-12-22, U.C.A. 1953. Installments under 
a decree of divorce for alimony or support of minor children become final 
judgments as soon as they are due and cannot thereafter be modified". (Emphasis 
added). 
In Seeley, the Supreme Court of Utah went on to state, citing Beesley v. 
Badger, 66 Utah 194, 240 p. 458 (1925), that: 
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"a decree for alimony in a gross sum as well as to past-due and unpaid 
installments stands upon the same footing as ordinary money judgments and may 
be enforced by execution in the same manner as ordinary money judgments may 
be enforced...". Id. 
Further, the Seeley court held, citing Openshaw v. Openshaw, 105 Utah 
574, 144 P.2d 528 (1943) that: 
"The question was raised as to whether the statute of limitation applied. This 
court held that it did and stated, "Execution therefore may issue for the 
arrearages accumulated within a period of eight years." Id. 
Moreover, the Seeley court stated, citing Simmons v. Simony 67 S.D. 
145, 290 N.W. 319 (1940) that: 
"When a judgment is rendered, payable in installments, the statue begins to run 
against the judgment from the time fixed for the payment of each installment for 
the part then payable". Id. 
WHEREFORE, it is well settled in the State of Utah, that the Statute of 
Limitations in an enforcement proceedings arising out of the Duty of Support, provides 
that the execution against the Defendant may be issued only for the arrearages 
accumulated within a period of eight years prior to the commencement of the action. 
Statute of Limitations in Pennsylvania 
The Plaintiffs argued and the Trial Court held, that the State of 
Pennsylvania has no statute of limitations applicable to the case herein: 
"The State's argument that Pennsylvania has the longer limitations period is 
based on the fact that unlike Utah, Pennsylvania law is void of a specific statute 
of limitations for the recovery of child and spousal support.. ..This position is 
supported by Morrissey v. Morrissey, 679 A.2d 234 (Pa.Super. 1996) where the 
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court.. ..stated that "[t]herefore, one might conclude that the statute of limitations 
is inapplicable because in Pennsylvania support orders are not subject to the 
defense of the statute of limitations." Id. at 236 (emphasis added)." 59 
The Plaintiffs conclusion is a gross misrepresentation of Morrissey 
Courts opinion. Standing alone, this portion of the decision makes it seem as if 
Morrissey mandates that in Pennsylvania support orders are not subject to the defense of 
the statute of limitations. However, when viewed in its actual context and alongside 
other portions of the decision, it is clear that Morrissey in fact clearly and convincingly 
supports the Defendant's position: 
"Therefore, one might conclude that the statute of limitations is inapplicable 
because in Pennsylvania support orders are not subject to the defense of the 
statute of limitations. However, .. ..We conclude that the specific provision of 
paragraph (c) controls over the more general provision of paragraph (a), see 1 
Pa.C.S. § 1933, thereby making the four year statute of limitations applicable. 
Thus we conclude that Mother's action remains valid only with respect to 
arreareages that have accrued since April 20, 1991, because the action for 
enforcement of these obligations was brought within four years of the payment 
due date# . 
We find further support for our position in several cases decided by this court. In 
Horowitz v. Horowitz, 411 Pa.Super. 21, 600 A.2d 982 (1991), the divorced 
parties entered into a support agreement in January 1977. Mother commenced an 
action to enforce the agreement, based on father's failure to make payments, in 
April 1988. This court held the four year statute of limitations barred collection 
of payments due before April 1984, four years prior to mother" enforcement 
action. The court reasoned that the accumulated arreareages were to be treated 
5 9
 State of Utah's Reply Brief of 12/19/98, at pg. 6 and State of Utah's Legal Brief of 
12/1/97 at pg. 12. 
• Mother's action was filed under the procedures for registration of a foreign judgment 
pursuant to the RURESA. However, we note that even under the Uniform Enforcement 
of Foreign Judgments Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 4306, which enables registration of foreign 
judgments in Pennsylvania, the four year statute of limitations at 42 Pa.C.S. § 5525(5) 
also would apply. National Union Fire Ins. V. Nicholas, 438 Pa.Super. 98, 651 A.2d 
1111(1994). 
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like judgments at the time each came due. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 3105(a) (obligation 
to pay support under agreement has same effect as court order). The defense of 
the statute of limitations applied despite the fact that child support 
payments were involved. (Emphasis added). 
Although Horowitz involved a support agreement and a support order, the statute 
of limitations has been similarly applied in cases involving alimony orders. In 
Nucci v. Nuccl 355 Pa.Super. 549, 513 A.2d 1059 (1986), this court applied the 
statute of limitations relating to judgments (then six years) to arreareages due on 
a New Hampshire alimony order. See also Cohen v. Cohen, 352 Pa.Super. 453, 
508 A.2d 561 (1986) (six year statute of limitations applies to judgments and 
runs as to each installment of alimony as it becomes due). We therefore must 
reverse the trial court's decision to the extent it held that the statute of limitations 
does not bar any of Mother's claim to the alleged child support arreareages. We 
hold that Mother is entitled to those amounts owing under the order from April 
20, 1991 forward". Id. at 236. 
The applicable statute is a "catchall" 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5527, which sets 
forth: 
"Any civil action or proceeding which is neither subject to another limitation 
specified in this subchapter nor excluded from the application of a period of 
limitation by section 5531^0 (relating to no limitation) must be commenced 
within six years".61 
60 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5531, reads: 
"The following actions and proceedings may be commenced at any time 
notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter except section 5521 (relating to 
limitations on foreign claims): 
(3) An action by the commonwealth, a county or an institution district against the real 
or personal property of persons who were legally liable to pay for the maintenance and 
support of persons who were public charges, including mental patients, to recover the 
cost of their maintenance and support."(emphasis added) 
Enacted July 9, 1976, P.L. 586, No. 142, § 2, effective June 27, 1978. 
61 In 1982, Dec. 20, P.L. 1409, no. 326, art. II, § 201, effective in 60 days. It amended 
former statutory provision, which was enacted July 9, 1976, P.L. 586, no. 142 § 2, 
effective June 27, 1978. 
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The Pennsylvania Courts had an opportunity to interpret the 
aforementioned statute in several cases, Cohen v. Cohen, 508 A.2d 561 (Pa.Super. 
1986), being controlling. 
In Cohen v. Cohen: 
The parties were divorced in 1975, by New Jersey Divorce Decree, which 
provided for permanent alimony support of $30/week. In February, 1976, Mr. 
Cohen moved to Philadelphia, PA., and last alimony payment was made in 
February of 1977. In September of 1983, New Jersey divorce decree was 
registered in Pennsylvania and enforcement proceedings were instituted for 
accumulated arrearages. Mr. Cohen asserted that enforcement was barred by 
statute of limitations provided in former 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5527 sections (1)&(6)62? 
amended by the currently effective statutory provision stated above. Lower court 
agreed and denied Ms. Cohen's petition for enforcement. Ms. Cohen appealed. 
Superior Court of Pennsylvania, in its opinion, id at 567, held that: 
"Appellant is correct in her assertion that the trial court erred in holding that her 
claim was completely barred under the six-year statute of limitations provided by 
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5527(1),(6). As appellant argues, appellee's obligation to pay 
alimony was an ongoing obligation, appellant's right to receipt of which accrued 
separately as to each installment as it became due (citation omitted). However, 
that does not mean that appellant had an indefinite period of time within which to 
file a claim for the unpaid installments. Under 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5527(1), (6), as 
applied to this case pursuant to the Uniform Statute of Limitations on Foreign 
Claims Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5521, appellant had six years within which to file an 
action for each unpaid installment". 
62 "The following actions and proceedings must be commenced within six years: 
(1) An action upon a judgment or decree of any court of the United States or of 
any state. 
(6) any civil action or proceeding which is neither subject to another limitation 
specified in this subchapter nor excluded from the application of a period of 
limitation by section 5531 (relating to no limitation)". 
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It went on to say, id at 567: 
"Therefore, although the trial court was correct insofar as it barred appellant's 
claim for the alimony installments due greater than six years before the filing of 
appellant's petition, it incorrectly barred appellant's claim for those installments 
due within six years of the filing of the petition". 
In Bullock v. Bullock 639 A.2d 826 (Pa.Super. 1994): 
Parties were married in 1937, and divorced on October 23, 1992. Mr. Bullock 
was arrested and incarcerated for about three weeks in 1958, for "desertion and 
non-support", based on his habit of excessive gambling. On release, on January 
9, 1959, he was ordered to pay Mrs. Bullock $35/week in spousal and child 
support. No payments were ever made. Mr. Bullock moved to Florida, and Mrs. 
Bullock was unaware of his residence until 1991. In January, 1993, Mrs. 
Bullock instituted a suit for payment of support arrearages, which over a period 
of 33 years, was calculated to be about $214,000. Trial court issued an order 
"directing the payment of arrearages for child and spousal support", id 827, and 
Mr. Bullock appealed. One of the issues raised was that statute of limitations, 
pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5527, precludes collection of some or all of the 
arrearages, awarded by trial court. 
Superior Court of Pennsylvania, in its opinion, id at 829, held that: 
"It has long been held [that] the statute of limitations will not bar relief in actions 
between husband and wife...." Horowitz v. Horowitz, 411 Pa.Super. 21, 600 
A.2d 982, 985 (1991) (citations omitted). Applying this precept here, given that 
the parties were divorced on October 23, 1992, the plaintiffs filing of a Petition 
for Contempt and for Payment of Arrearages on January 4, 1993, falls within the 
statute of limitations for instituting a cause of action. See, e.g., 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 
5527 (6 years). Therefore, the plaintiff was not foreclosed from initiating 
collection proceedings on overdue support payments". 
Superior Court of Pennsylvania denied Mr. Bullock's argument, not on 
the basis that there is no statute of limitations applicable to "support duty" arising in 
divorce, but rather that there is no statute of limitations applicable to the support duty 
imposed while the parties are married, as parties were not formally divorced until 1992. 
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In Miller v. Bistransky, 679 A.2d 1300 (Pa.Super. 1996): 
In December, 1945, Mr. Bistransky was convicted of criminal charges of 
desertion and non-support, and was ordered to pay spousal support of $25/month, 
and child and spousal support of $40/month upon birth of his child in August, 
1946. Mr. Bistransky, made requisite $25/month spousal support payments, but 
never paid $15/month allocable to child support. Instead, through Department of 
Veterans Affairs, payments were made directly to the child. Parties were 
divorced in May, 1947. The action for payment of child support arrearages was 
instituted in July of 1994. Lower court held that child support arrearages accrued 
prior to the effective date of applicable statute of limitations (July 27, 1978), 
were not time barred, and issued an order directing a payment of child support 
for the entire 18 year duration. Mr. Bistransky appealed. 
Superior Court of Pennsylvania, in its opinion, id at 1302, held that: 
"In the instant case, a review of the certified record reveals that the trial court 
found the six year statute does not apply to a cause of action that accrued prior to 
its effective date of July 27, 1978 , we affirm this issue on the basis of the 
opinion below." 
Judge Popovich, in his dissenting opinion, id 1304, stated that: 
"..., I am convinced appellee is barred by the statute of limitations from asserting 
the claim for child support arrearages , I agree with appellant that Cohen v. 
Cohen, 352 Pa.Super. 453, 508 A.2d 561 (1986) is controlling and the six year 
statute of limitations, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5527, should be applied if we are going to 
consider this criminal judgment of sentence to now be a civil support order". 
It is of note that majority opinion in Bullock v. Bullock, 639 A.2d 826 
(Pa.Super. 1994), cited above, was also written by Judge Popovich. 
In Miller v. Jolley, 500 A.2d 485 (Pa.Super. 1985): 
"On March 29, 1984, under Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of 
Support Act, Ms. Miller brought child support action in Pennsylvania against 
putative father residing in Arizona, alleging that Mr. Jolley was the father of her 
child, born on May 9, 1974. The petition pursuant to URESA was certified by 
Pennsylvania court and forwarded to the court in Arizona. Mr. Jolley 
responded in Pennsylvania court only, stating that he was entitled to dismissal, 
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as claim was time barred pursuant to 6 year statute of limitations found in 42 
Pa.C.S.A. § 6704(b). The lower court agreed, by dismissing the complaint and 
withdrawing the certification of the complaint to the state of Arizona. Ms. Miller 
appealed. 
Miller v. Jolley is directly on point regarding the controversies in the case 
sub judiciae. Superior Court of Pennsylvania, in its opinion, id at 486-487, held that: 
"Both Pennsylvania and Arizona have adopted the 1968 version of the Revised 
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. This legislation was designed 
to improve and extend the enforcement of duties of support. Oman v. Oman, 333 
Pa.Super. 356, 483 A.2d 606 (1984). The question of which body of law to 
apply in a given factual situation is answered in Section 6747 of the Act which 
provides: 
Choice of Law 
Duties of support applicable under this subchapter are those imposed 
under the laws of any state where the obligor was present for the period 
during which support is sought. The obligor is presumed to have been 
present in the responding state during the period for which support is 
sought until otherwise shown. 
The term "obligor" is defined as "any person owing a duty of support or against 
whom a proceedings for the enforcement of a duty of support or registration of 
support order is commenced." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6742. Herein, Appellee fits the 
definition of an "obligor" since a proceeding for the enforcement of support had 
been commenced against him. The state in which Appellee, "obligor", was 
present was Arizona. In view of the above, any duties of support applicable in 
this case are those imposed under the laws of the state of Arizona. For this 
reason it was error to apply the Pennsylvania statute of limitations as a bar 
to this action. Further, Appellee can not avoid the provisions of this statute 
and choose his own forum by filing his Answer in a Pennsylvania 
Court.(emphasis added). 
The trial court failed to apply the "Choice of Law" provision of RURESA, and 
instead dismissed the Complaint based on 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6704(b) which states: 
Limitations of actions-All actions or proceedings to establish the paternity 
of a child born out of wedlock brought under this section must be 
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commenced within six years of the birth of the child, except where the 
reputed father shall have voluntarily contributed to the support of the child 
or shall have acknowledged in writing his paternity, in which case an 
action or proceedings may be commenced at any time within two years of 
any such contribution or acknowledgment by the reputed father. 
The above speaks in relation to actions "brought under this section". Section 
6704 is entitled "Commencement of Support action or proceedings" and refers to 
those actions commenced under subchapter A of Chapter 67., and subchapter A 
contains "General Provisions". The provisions of RURESA are outlined in 
Subchapter B of Chapter 67. 
It is clear that this action was not commenced under subchapter A, but rather 
under subchapter B, RURESA. Contained in the record is the Complaint which 
states: 
WHEREFORE, the Petitioner prays for the following relief, based upon 
the general powers of the Court and specifically upon the provisions and 
remedy in such cases provided for by Act No. 50 of the Commonwealth 
of Pennsylvania, approved the lO^1 day of May, A.D. 1951, 279 P.L. and 
known as the "Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act," as last 
amended in 1972. 
Further, the Erie County Court certified in the record that the Complaint was 
"duly filed in the Reciprocal Support Office, Domestic Relations Division in a 
proceeding against the above-named Respondent commenced under the 
provisions of the 'Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act' as last 
amended in 1972". Since this action was commenced under Subchapter B, 
RURESA, the trial court erred in not applying the provisions of that subchapter. 
In conclusion, we find that Section 6747 of RURESA mandates that any 
duties of support or which Appellee may be responsible are those imposed 
under the laws of Arizona, and any defenses available should be raised in an 
Arizona court applying Arizona law. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court 
order which dismissed Appellant's complaint in support and withdrew 
certification of the Complaint to the state of Arizona, and direct the court to 
certify the Complaint to the state of Arizona in accordance with this opinion 
and 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6754. (emphasis added). 
Additionally, in Horowitz v. Horowitz, 600 A.2d 982, 987-988 (Pa.Super. 
1991), Pennsylvania Superior Court had an opportunity to specifically address the 
public policy concerns regarding application of statute of limitations to the duty of 
support. The Horowitz Court concluded and held that: 
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"[11] Finally, appellant and amicus suggest that public policy should not deny a 
child the right to support because of the agreement or failure to enforce an 
agreement by the parent. This argument misses the point. Appellant cites the 
proposition that it should be the public policy of Pennsylvania to adopt the 
position that the statute of limitations does not apply and although citing 
numerous cases which protect the child's right to ongoing and present support, 
there are none in this jurisdiction which are authority for her position. The right 
to present and continued support may not be equated with failure of a parent to 
enforce an agreement or support Order for amounts that have been accumulated 
prior to the running of the statute. Those amounts become debts or judgments as 
provided by contract or statute, and absent a statute providing special treatment, 
the defense of the statute of limitations applies. This is not to be confused with 
running of a statute of limitations for bringing an action for support or paternity. 
Such a duty is a continuing one until the child reaches majority or is emancipated 
and no statute bars such an action until the duty terminates by operation of law. 
This does not mean that an action may be brought to collect retroactive amounts 
due earlier than the date a complaint for support is filed. See Pa.R.C.P. 
1910.17(a) and 23 Pa.C.S. § 3701(e). Public policy issues are generally better 
left to the legislature to formulate rather than by edicts of the court, particularly 
when it can be demonstrated that the legislature has selectively considered the 
effect of statutes of limitations relating to children in domestic, civil and criminal 
matters. As to support, actions for support for children of a marriage are and 
have been sustainable from birth to majority. In recent years, responding to 
pronouncements by the United States Supreme Court, statutes of limitations for 
bringing actions for support of children out of wedlock were extended from one 
year, to two years, to six years, and finally, as codified at 23 Pa.C.S. 4343(b), to 
eighteen years Clearly, the legislature has acknowledged special 
circumstances when the statute of limitations must be extended for the benefit of 
children and it cannot be assumed that failure to provide such an extension in 
child support cases was a matter of legislative neglect or omission.. ..The statute 
of limitations applies whether the duty runs to the child directly or to the 
custodial parent as guardian of the child. While the public policy considerations 
may warrant a change in the law, under the facts of this case we must affirm the 
judgment of the trial court. 
For the foregoing reasons, we find no merit in any of wife's claims of error, and 
we affirm the judgment of the trial court in its entirety." 
WHEREFORE, a review of the applicable statutory provisions and case 
law clearly and convincingly supports the conclusion that the State of Pennsylvania has 
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a six year Statute of Limitations applicable to the case herein and the Utah eight year 
Statue of Limitations to collecting arrearages applies, either under URESA or UIFSA, 
as it is the longer of the two and the effect of the judgments obtained under either of the 
proceedings is identical. 
5. Whether, the Plaintiff, is entitled to collect any alimony or spousal support for 
the period the Plaintiff cohabited with a person of the opposite sex and whether 
any order ol the court that a party pay alimony to a iormer spouse terminates 
upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is 
cohabiting with another person? 
The Trial Court erred in not ruling upon the Defendant's Motion for 
Sanctions for Failure to Cooperate in Discovery and for Summary Judgment, as there 
is no question of fact, but of law. 
The parties Property Settlement Agreement, dated January 5, 1987, and 
incorporated into a final divorce decree by the Circuit Court of the County of 
Chesterfield, Virginia, on July 24, 1987, provided that: 
"Spousal support shall terminate at husband's death, wife's death, her 
remarriage, her graduation from medical school or June 30, 1992, whichever first 
occurs". 
Most importantly, the Utah statute is clear that alimony payments and 
spousal support terminate upon cohabitation of a party. In the case herein, where the 
parties did not agree otherwise, alimony and support payments must terminate in 
accordance with the statute. Accordingly, as of May, or June, 1986, the date of 
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commencement of cohabitation of the wife with Eric Femmer, her present husband and a 
member of the opposite sex, payments and/or accrual of alimony and spousal support to 
the wife, Robin E. Kirby, must have been terminated. 
"Cohabitation" means to live together in an intimate relationship, 
generally without the sanction of a legal marriage. 
The relevant and controlling statute is U.C.A. § 30-3-5(9): 
(9) "Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former 
spouse is cohabiting with another person".63 
In addition, Compiler's Notes to U.C.A. § 30-3-5(9) set forth that: 
"Laws 1995, ch. 330, which amended this section, provides in § 2 that the 
Legislature does not intend that termination of alimony based on cohabitation, in 
accordance with Subsection (9), "be interpreted in any way to condone such a 
relationship for any purpose." (emphasis added). 
As stated previously, citing Nixon v. Salt Lake City Corp., 898 P.2d 265, 
268 (Utah 1995): 
"the best evidence of the legislature's intent is the plain meaning of the statute". 
In the controlling case of Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669, (Utah 
1985), the Supreme Court of Utah addressing the meaning of "cohabitation" stated: 
63 As amended, effective May 1, 1995. The prior statutory provision (former subsection 
(6)), provided that: 
(6) "Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former 
spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if it is further 
established by the person receiving alimony that that relationship or 
association is without any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume". 
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"Neither the word "cohabitation" nor any variation of it appears in U.C.A., 1953, 
Title 30, chapter 3, the statutory provision governing divorce". 
It went on to say, that the process of judicial finding of cohabitation: 
".. .is in reality a mixed question of fact and law...". Id., at 671. 
And: 
"We therefore decide that there are two key elements to be considered in 
determining whether Defendant was cohabiting with Mr. Hudson: common 
residency and sexual contact evidencing a conjugal association. Consistent with 
our holding in Knuteson, 619 P.2d at 1389, common residency means the sharing 
of a common abode that both parties consider their principal domicile for more 
than a temporary or brief period of time. Sexual contact means participation in a 
relatively permanent sexual relationship akin to that generally existing between 
husband and wife". 
The Haddow Court further stated that: 
"Our review of out-of-state case law discloses that in some jurisdictions a third 
element, shared living expenses, is either an essential ingredient of cohabitation, 
In the Matter of Marriage of Edwards, 73 Or.App. 272, 698 P.2d 542 (1985), or 
evidence of it, In re Marriage of Roofe, 122 Ill.App.3d 56, 46j0 N.E.2d 784 
(1984). Although we do not consider the sharing of the financial obligations 
surrounding the maintenance of a household to be a requisite element of 
cohabitation, we do find it significant...". 
The Utah legislature responded to Haddow, by enacting U.C.A. § 30-3-
5(9) and defining cohabitation similarly to Haddow. See also, Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 
908, 917 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
Moreover, it must be noted that Pennsylvania has similar statute relating 
to termination of spousal alimony and support on the grounds of cohabitation. It is 
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3706, which states that: 
"No petitioner is entitled to receive any award of alimony where the petitioner, 
subsequent to the divorce pursuant to which alimony is being sought, has entered 
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into cohabitation with a person of the opposite sex who is not a member of the 
family of the petitioner within the degrees of consanguinity"64 
While the statute does not define cohabitation, the legislative intent of 23 
Pa.C.S.A. § 3706 is clear as to its meaning. It is a fundamental rule of construction that 
in construing the words of a statute the legislative intent is the great and controlling 
principle. The legislative intent behind 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 507 was revealed in the 
comments of Representative McVerry, who stated that without "507's language the 
legislature would be sanctioning "unmarried persons living together yet being supported 
and/or financed by the remnants of a former marriage." "Miller v. Miller, 352 Pa.Super. 
432, 439, 508 A.2d 55j0, 554, (1986) citing HJ 1843L, reprinted in J.A. Rounick, Pa, 
Matrimonial Practice, Part 3, App. B at 49 (1983). 
It is undisputed that since May of 1986, when Eric Femmer arrived to the 
United States, Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, he continuously resided and 
"cohabited" with the Plaintiff in the same residence. Their continuous and long-term 
period of "cohabitation" culminated in marriage on August 19, 1989, and a son, born on 
June 1, 1992. Moreover, the Plaintiff and Eric Femmer have cohabited for more than a 
year prior to the Divorce Decree entered on July 24, 1987. Eric Femmer has 
continuously resided in the same residence with the Plaintiff, and the Defendant's 
children. 
64 p.L. 1240, No. 206, § 2, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3706 (Dec. 19, 1990), amending 23 
Pa.C.S.A. 507. 
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In addition, pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 33 and Rule 
34, the Defendant, on November 7, 1997, via Express Mail #EI817747289US, mailed to 
Robin E. Kirby and her husband, Eric Femmer, A. Alexander Jacoby's First Set of 
Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents. The U.S. Post Office 
confirmed, that the documents were received by the addressees at 9:41 a.m., on 
November 8, 1997. The receipt of the documents was also confirmed by the Plaintiffs 
Attorney, Renee M. Jiminez, Assistant Attorney General, during a telephone 
conversation with the Defendant, on or about November 11, 1997. 
To date, Robin E. Kirby and her husband, Eric Femmer have completely 
ignored, have not complied and have failed to reply to the Interrogatories and Request 
for Production of Documents. They are subject to sanctions pursuant to U.R.C.P. Rule 
37 (b)(2)(A)(B)&(C). 
On or about January 12, 1998, the Defendant submitted to the Trial Court 
the Motion for Sanctions for Failure to Cooperate in Discovery. Though not formally 
ruled upon, the motion was not ruling upon, by the Judgment and Order of February 4, 
1998, which reduced the arreareages to sum certain, without a prerequisite hearing.65 
The Trial Court erred in not ruling on the Defendant's Motion for 
Sanctions for Failure to Cooperate in Discovery, as: 
A. Pursuant to U.R.C.P. Rule 37 (b)(2)(A) the Defendant is entitled to an order 
that the Defendant has established that the Plaintiff has cohabited with a 
person of the opposite sex from May or June, 1986. 
65ciR 
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B. Pursuant to U.R.C.P. Rule 37 (b)(2)(B) the Defendant is entitled to an order 
prohibiting the Plaintiffs from introducing into evidence any matters 
opposing Defendant's establishment of cohabitation from May or June, 1986. 
C. Pursuant to U.R.C.P. Rule 37 (b)(2)(C) the Defendant is entitled to an order 
rendering a judgment, that the Plaintiffs are not entitled to arrearage for any 
alimony or spousal support, after May or June, 1986. As the arrearage for the 
periods of May 1986, through March 1987, was reduced to judgment by a 
Virginia Court, the Plaintiffs are not entitled to arrearage of any alimony or 
spousal support from April 1987, forward. 
WHEREFORE, the Defendant respectfully requests this Honorable Court 
find that pursuant to U.C.A. § 30-3-4 (9) and the Haddow decision, the Plaintiffs are 
not entitled to arrearage for any alimony or spousal support after May, 1986, the point 
in time of the commencement of cohabitation. However, as the arrearage from May, 
1986, until April, 1987, was reduced to judgment by the URESA Court Order of April 
17, 1987, the Plaintiffs are not entitled to arrearage for any alimony or spousal support 
from April 1987, forward. As there is no question of fact, but of law, the Defendant's 
motion for Summary Judgment, setting off arrearages accordingly was improperly not 
ruled upon. 
6. Whether, the Defendant as a matter of Law is entitled to Reduction in Child 
Support for Extended Visitation? 
The Trial Court erred in not ruling upon the Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, as there is no question of fact, but of law, whether, the 
Defendant is entitled to Reduction in Child Support for Extended Visitation. 
The Defendant relocated and established residence in Utah in June, 1986. 
The Plaintiff, relocated to Pennsylvania in May, 1986, and subsequently in June, 1992, 
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to Massachusetts. Due to the distances between the residences, extended visitation, 
with the Defendant, occurred during the summer months, usually during the month of 
July. 
The Defendant is entitled to 50% reduction in child support payments 
during the periods of extended visitation, pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-45-7.11: 
1) the child support order shall provide that the base child support award be 
reduced by 50% for each child for time periods during which the child is with 
the noncustodial parent by order of the court or by written agreement of the 
parties for at least 25 of any 30 consecutive days. If the dependent child is a 
recipient of Aid to Families with Dependent Children, any agreement by the 
parties for reduction of child support during extended visitation shall be 
approved by the administrative agency. However, normal visitation and 
holiday visits to the custodial parent shall not be considered an interruption of 
the consecutive day requirement. 
2) For purposes of this section the per child amount to which the abatement 
applies shall be calculated by dividing the base child support award by the 
number of children included in the award. 
WHEREFORE, the Defendant is entitled to a 50% reduction in child 
support payments during the periods of extended visitations. The arrearages must be set 
accordingly. 
7. The Defendant, is entitled to present the evidence ior the disputed amounts oi 
the payments that were not credited, before the Trial Court. 
The Trial Court erred when by the Judgment and Order of 
February 4,1998, the Trial Court reduced the arreareages to sum certain, without a 
prerequisite hearing, as the Defendant was not given an opportunity to present the 
evidence for the disputed amounts of the payments that were not credited. 
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The Defendant, throughout the proceedings, consistently maintained, that 
there were disputed amounts of the payments made that were not credited by the 
Plaintiffs.66 
The Defendant, is entitled to present the evidence for payments that were 
made by him for which no credit was given as he has specifically reserved that issue, 
throughout the proceedings for future adjudication. 
To hold to the contrary will be in violation of the due process clause of 
United States and Utah Constitutions. 
WHEREFORE, the Defendant, respectfully requests this Honorable Court 
to remand the case to the Trial Court for evidentiary proceedings for resolution of the 
disputed amounts of the payments made by the Defendant that were not credited by the 
Plaintiffs. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant respectfully requests this Honorable Court to issue an 
order for the following relief: 
1. URESA is controlling. 
2. From July 1, 1997, forward, UIFSA is controlling, if and only if, application 
of UIFSA will affect only procedural and not vested, unalterable substantive 
rights of the parties. 
3. The State of Pennsylvania has a six year Statue of Limitations applicable to 
the case herein. 
4. The Utah eight year Statue of Limitations to collecting arreareages applies, 
either under URESA or UIFSA, as it is the longer of the two and the effect of 
judgments obtained under either of the proceedings is identical. Accordingly, 
execution against the Defendant may be issued only for the arrearages 
accumulated within a period of eight years prior to commencement of the 
6 6
 R.T. of 6/25/97 atpgs. 3-6, R.T. of 10/8/97 atpgs. 8-9, R.T. of 12/8/97 atpg. 33. 
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action herein, i.e. only arrears from May 20,1989, the periodic installment 
due date, forward remain, the rest are time barred. 
5. The Plaintiff, is not entitled to collect alimony or spousal support for the 
period the Plaintiff cohabited with a person of the opposite sex. Any order of 
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon 
establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is 
cohabiting with another person. As the arrearage for a period from May 1986 
through March 1987 was reduced to judgment by Virginia Court, the Plaintiff 
is not entitled to alimony or spousal support from April 1987, forward. 
6. The Defendant, is entitled to 50% reduction in base child support obligation, 
for each child, for the periods of extended visitation. Child support obligation 
should be adjusted accordingly. 
7. The Defendant, is entitled to present the evidence for the disputed amounts of 
the payments that were not credited, before the Trial Court. 
8. The Order on Order to Show Cause, dated November 20, 1997, is vacated. 
9. The proceedings pursuant to the petition for Order to Show Cause (UIFSA), 
are dismissed without prejudice. 
10. The Defendant's right to Court appointed counsel for the contempt 
proceedings is expressly reserved. 
11. The case is remanded to the Trial Court for calculation of the arreareages, consistent 
with the above opinion. 
ADDENDUM 
No addendum is necessary. 
Respectfully Submitted By: 
DATED: July 9, 1998 A. Alexander Jacoby, prose 
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